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Abstract 
Based on analyses of banal nationalism (Billig, 1995) and civil religion (Bellah, 1967), 
we reasoned that devout, intrinsic religion would be associated with the salience and 
importance of a nation's depiction of itself (i.e., the national self-stereotype). The 
contents of national self-stereotypes were expected to differ as a function of the nation's 
distinct history. To test this possibility, Canadians and Americans were asked to list and 
then rate the importance of the thoughts that came to mind about their own country. 
Among Americans, intrinsic religious orientation predicted greater ascribed importance 
to the national "heritage" (e.g., freedom, equal opportunity, tradition, and family), and to 
traditional national symbols such as the flag. Among Canadians, intrinsic religious 
orientation predicted greater ascribed importance to the official policy of 
multiculturalism, but was unrelated to the enshrining of national symbols. In both cases, 
intrinsic religion was associated with the endorsement of ideological components of the 
nation's dominant self-stereotype. Implications of these findings for both religious and 
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“For God and Country”:  
Religion and the Endorsement of National Self-Stereotypes 
Defining the proper relationship between "church" and "state" has, for centuries, 
sparked considerable debate. Indeed, even within recent history, preferred models of 
religion and nation relations as institutions have varied dramatically--from the Islamic 
theocracy of Iran to the officially atheistic former Soviet Union. Religiously inclined 
individuals have likewise struggled to define their role as citizens of a nation-state, with 
equally divergent consequences, leading Hood, Spilka, Hunsberger, and Gorsuch (1996) 
to suggest that religion can inspire either acceptance or rejection of the dominant political 
system.    
Certainly, there exists much anecdotal evidence consistent with both acceptance 
and rejection of the political system by religious groups and their members. In the United 
States, for example, religions indicate their support for the political system by their 
unobtrusive display of the Stars and Stripes near the pulpit or altar in places of worship, 
and in such congregation-sponsored events as Fourth of July celebrations. More extreme 
manifestations of acceptance include attempts to enlist the political system as an agent 
for instituting religiously-inspired public policy by organizations such as the Moral 
Majority or the Christian Coalition. Yet, religion in the U.S. can also seemingly inspire 
rejection of the political system. Salient examples include refusal to recite the Pledge of 
Allegiance among Jehovah's Witness schoolchildren, or the withholding of taxes by 
congregations of the American Coalition of Unregistered Churches. Such observations 
nicely illustrate the variety of possible religious connections to existing national 
ideology. They fail, however, to identify whether (and why) certain responses are more 
typical than others among religious persons. Indeed, Hood et al. (1996) remarked that the 
interface of "faith and politics" is a "realm that begs for exacting research" (p. 145). 
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Thus, in the present research, we sought to examine the relationship between religion and 
what is perhaps the most basic political construct: the nation. 
The Inescapability of Nationhood: "Banal Nationalism" 
According to Billig (1995), "nation" is a fundamental political construct because 
its existence is a necessary presupposition for political dialogues to take place. The 
phrase "Members of the Canadian Parliament," for example, implies both a unity and an 
exclusiveness of purpose. Even if two Members of Parliament belong to opposing parties 
or bitterly disagree for ideological reasons, they do share the common goal of shaping the 
political system of their own nation, Canada in this example, as opposed to some other 
nation, such as the United States. Indeed, Billig (1995) argued that "nation" is an 
inescapable construct even when the focus of attention is on more mundane matters, as 
when national boundaries are displayed on a continental weather map, or when an 
"unwaved" national flag hangs unassumingly over a community sports arena. The result, 
to use Billig's term, is "banal nationalism," where an implicit awareness of one's national 
identity is maintained via such unobtrusive reminders. 
Of what does national identity consist? As with other social or political 
categories, one's nation can provide first a sense of "we-ness," of identification with the 
group (Koch, 1993; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Those who do not belong are 
correspondingly transformed into "foreigners," members of an outgroup nation. Second, 
the nation provides a common group stereotype (analogous to the self-concept at the 
individual level), which aids the citizen in defining who s/he is, as well as how s/he 
should act (e.g., Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Turner, 1982). In international affairs, for 
example, Canadians may perceive themselves primarily as diplomats or peacekeepers, 
whereas Americans may perceive themselves as committed to promoting freedom and 
democracy via their role as the “world’s police force” -- perceptions that may, at least to 
some degree, reflect the actual status conditions of the two countries (see Oakes, Haslam, 
& Turner, 1994). Third, the nation provides outward markers or symbols of its collective 
  
       Religion and National Image  5  
identity such as flags, anthems, monuments, and heroes. Such symbols serve an 
important communicative function for outsiders as well as insiders. As Billig (1995) has 
pointed out, no nation is recognized as such by the world community without distinctive 
symbols such as national flags or anthems. 
Fusing Faith and Politics: Civil Religion 
 We suggest that the combination of collective identity, common group 
stereotypes, and the shared symbols that are inherent in nationhood bears a striking 
resemblance to core features of religious systems. Devoutly religious individuals, relative 
to the less devout, are highly motivated to maintain perceptions of themselves as 
exemplary religious group members in the face of disconfirming evidence for example 
(see Burris & Jackson, in press). Orthodoxy of belief, or adherence to "correct" ideology, 
seems particularly integral to maintaining religious group boundaries (Deconchy, 1980, 
1984). Religious symbols and religiously-connoted kinship language have been 
implicated as potential facilitators of intense religious experience and group-oriented 
prosocial behavior, respectively (Batson, 1983; Batson, Schoenrade, & Ventis, 1993). 
Given the evident similarities between the two, it is not surprising that the boundary 
between "faith and politics" -- to use Hood et al.'s (1996) phrase -- can sometimes blur, 
resulting in a syncretism labeled "civil religion."   Invoked most often in analyses 
of the American political system (e.g., Bellah, 1967; Benson, 1981; Billig, 1995; Hood et 
al., 1996; Reimer, 1995), civil religion has been applied occasionally (e.g., Hood et al., 
1996) to situations in which a religious group such as the Christian Coalition attempts to 
further its agenda through widespread political involvement. In such cases, the 
implication is that the nation is subordinate to religion. More often, however, the reverse 
is implied--that is, religious identity, ideology, and symbols are enlisted to further the 
nation's dominant political interests. Billig (1995) stated this position forcefully: "The 
order of nations is not designed to serve God, but God is to serve the order" (p. 5). 
Regardless of which is subordinate--religion or nation--or whether that varies by context, 
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civil religion supports and legitimates the dominant political system.   How pervasive, 
then, is civil religion? That is, to what degree do religious and national group identities 
overlap among citizens, at least in North America? That religion is viewed as integral to 
"the American way of life" seems well established. Reimer (1995), for example, noted 
that the percentage of Americans who report regular attendance at religious services is 
substantially and consistently higher than percentages in all other industrialized nations. 
Moreover, evidence exists that the reported frequency of church attendance among 
Americans is greater than actual attendance (e.g., Hadaway, Marler, & Chaves, 1993), 
underscoring the apparent social desirability of religious involvement. Similarly, stated 
agreement with traditional religious concepts (e.g., belief in God) among Americans 
tends to be relatively high even among the religiously inactive compared to Canadians 
who are not religiously active for example (see Reimer, 1995).   
 Thus, there is ample support for the suggestion that the majority of Americans 
offer, at minimum, token assent to religious ideas or ideals, at least when asked directly 
by a surveyor.  The question remains as to how deeply ingrained such religious assent is 
and whether citizens spontaneously link their national and religious identities. We are 
unaware of any research that has directly addressed this question. There are, however, 
some strands of evidence that supply indirect support for the suggestion that devoutly 
religious individuals might be particularly likely to absorb aspects of their national or 
cultural milieu. For example, based on a then-extensive review of the literature, Dittes 
(1969, p. 636) noted that "religion is associated...with a strong responsiveness to the 
suggestions of other persons or other external influences." More recently, Schwartz and 
Huismans (1995) found consistent evidence of commitment to preserving traditional 
values across four major Western religions (see also Burris & Tarpley, 1998, Study 3). 
Likewise, Snook and Gorsuch (1985) observed that a measure of devout religious 
commitment predicted greater preferred social distance from non-Whites among white 
high school students of Afrikaaner, but not English, descent, suggesting that the nature of 
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the relationship between religion and prejudice depends upon subcultural norms (see also 
Batson et al., 1993, for an analysis of the regional variability of the link between religion 
and prejudice).  Finally, devout religious commitment has been found to be associated 
with increased social desirability concerns, although the interpretation of this oft-
replicated finding remains open to debate (e.g., Batson, Naifeh, & Pate, 1978; Leak & 
Fish, 1989; Richards, 1994; Watson, Morris, Foster, & Hood, 1986; and for a recent 
examination of the link between social desirability concerns and conformity to perceived 
group norms in a nonreligious context, see Postmes & Spears, 1998).  
 Thus, available evidence (some of which is cross-cultural) suggests that 
(especially devout) religious individuals are likely to endorse the values and norms that 
are consistent with the (sub)culture in which they are embedded. It therefore seems 
reasonable to suggest that religious individuals may be also likely to feel identified with 
or connected to their nation, to engage in national self-stereotyping, and to spontaneously 
associate "official" symbols with their nation. Even if this hypothesized relationship 
between religion and national identity generalizes across nations, however, the specific 
contents of national identity may obviously vary considerably. To illustrate, we consider 
the potential similarities and differences in national identity content between two 
neighboring nations: the U.S. and Canada. 
National Identity Among Neighbors: The United States and Canada 
 One of the more thorough expositions of the differing national identities of the 
U.S. and Canada has been provided by Lipset (1990a, 1990b, 1996). According to Lipset, 
the clarity of U.S./Canada differences depends upon the context of comparison:  Subtle 
differences between these two North American nations can be obscured if both are 
compared to Tanzania, Paraguay, or Kazakhstan, for example. When, however, they are 
directly compared with each other, the differences are more obvious, and can be traced to 
the contrasting historical origins of the two countries. As a result of the American 
Revolution, the United States was founded largely by a group of political and religious 
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refugees whose commitment to populist democracy was motivated, in part, by their 
desire to forestall the potential for oppression deemed inherent in monarchies and other 
elitist forms of government. As a consequence of having been born of such ideologically-
justified rebellion, the U.S. came to be more individualistic, more assertive, and more 
possessing of a clear concept of its national "way of life" than its northern neighbor. In 
contrast, the settlers of Upper Canada were generally not malcontented refugees. Rather, 
they were individuals who accepted living in the New World as subjects of the British (or 
French) governing body, with the eventual establishment of a bicultural, confederated 
Canada being motivated more by convenience than by an ideologically-rooted desire for 
independence from the motherlands. Thus, owing to its more peaceable birth, Canada is 
more oriented towards cooperation, is less individualistic and assertive, and has a less 
clear concept of a national way of life than does its southern neighbor (Lipset, 1990a, 
1990b, 1996). Given these very different histories, in what ways might the contents of the 
respective national identities of contemporary Americans and Canadians differ? 
 In the U.S., commonplace phrases capture the clear conception of a national way 
of life that Lipset (1990a, 1990b, 1996) suggested. "The American Dream," for example, 
conjures up historic images of hopeful immigrants coming to America, working hard, and 
becoming successful. This promise of individualistic reward--along with professed values 
such as freedom, democracy, and family--are the core elements of "the American Way" 
or "the American Heritage." Moreover, the U.S's world presence and reputation as a 
"superpower" is consistent with its ideologically-based drive to "keep the world safe for 
democracy," i.e., to protect and to promote American interests.  These aspects of the 
American self-stereotype are crystallized in the U.S.'s "official" symbols -- pervasive, 
potent, and banal reminders of the American way of life (Billig, 1995). The Stars and 
Stripes, for example, is the devotional focal point for both the American national anthem 
and the Pledge of Allegiance.  Thus, to the extent that American civil religion encourages 
a fusion of national and religious identities, we might expect religiously committed 
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(versus nonreligious) Americans to be particularly likely to think of their country in 
terms of its shared "heritage," its international role as a world power, and its official 
symbols, such as the flag.  
 Characterizing Canadian national identity has historically proven to be a difficult 
task. Rather than having well-known phrases to describe Canadian identity, we can only 
point to "symptoms of Canada," to use Keohane's (1997) phrase. Perhaps the most 
frequently cited symptom is Canada's ideological commitment to multiculturalism, 
declared to be an official policy of the federal government in 1971 (see Lipset, 1990a). 
Reflective of its confederation as a joint venture of France and Britain, Canada's 
emphasis upon maintaining cultural distinctness among its various immigrant populations 
contrasts sharply with the "melting pot" (or cultural assimilation) model of the U.S. 
Canada tends also to be more pro-government than is the U.S., a stance facilitated by the 
absence of political revolution in Canadian history and exemplified by greater federal and 
provincial regulation of economic and social matters (e.g., taxes and health care; see 
Lipset, 1990a, 1990b). 
 Canadians are arguably more likely than Americans also to include geography 
and the natural environment as part of their national self-stereotype. The land may loom 
larger in Canadian consciousness, in part, because Canada is physically larger but much 
less densely populated than the U.S. (e.g., Keohane, 1997; Olive, 1996). Finally, a 
probable symptom of Canada is a sheepish attitude toward national symbols, due in part 
to the fact that the official adoption of such symbols has been relatively recent. For 
example, the red and white Maple Leaf became the official flag of Canada in 1965; "O 
Canada" became the official national anthem in 1980. This, in combination with Canada's 
commitment to multiculturalism, may effectively suppress the importance of traditional 
symbols with respect to Canadian national identity. To the extent that there exists a 
fusion of religious and national identities in Canada, we would therefore expect that 
religiously committed (versus nonreligious) Canadians may be particularly likely to think 
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of their country in terms of its multiculturalism, its pro-government stance, and its 
physical features, but not in terms of its official national symbols.  
The Present Research 
 In order to test our specific predictions for the two countries, we first asked 
American and Canadian students to list whatever thoughts that came to mind when they 
thought of their respective nations. They were then asked to rate the importance of each 
feature or thought that they had generated. Assessing the degree of importance assigned 
to the different self-generated thoughts seemed to be as critical as assessing the contents 
of the thoughts themselves for, as research in ethnic stereotyping has shown, an 
individual's awareness of the content of a stereotype does not necessarily imply that s/he 
endorses it or perceives is at valid (Devine, 1989).  
 We then content analyzed participants' thoughts about their nation.  Based on the 
preceding theoretical analysis, we expected several specific content themes to be evident 
and ascribed greater importance as a function of whether they were part of the nation's 
self-stereotype.  Specifically, we expected heritage and power themes, along with 
distinctive national symbols, to emerge and be deemed as more important among 
Americans versus Canadians.  Similarly, we expected multiculturalism, government, and 
environment themes to emerge and be deemed more important among Canadians versus 
Americans.  Thus, to determine the respective national self-stereotypes of the U.S. and 
Canada, we subsequently assessed whether the absolute magnitude of each importance-
weighted thought category differed by nation.  
 In order to test whether devout religious commitment would predict endorsement 
of the national self-stereotype in the U.S. and/or Canada, we had participants complete 
measures of religious commitment and, for comparison purposes, measures of national 
identification and authoritarianism. Thus, to assess whether the "faith and politics" 
relationship is similar for each nation, we subsequently compared religious commitment/ 
national self-stereotype correlations for Americans and Canadians. We expected that 
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religious commitment would be associated with thoughts related to the categories 
centered on heritage, power, and official national symbols such as the Stars and Stripes 
among Americans. In contrast, among Canadians, we expected that religious commitment 
would be associated with thoughts concerning multiculturalism, the government, and the 
physical environment, but not with recently acquired national symbols such as the Maple 
Leaf.   
Method 
Participants 
 The American sample consisted of 83 psychology undergraduate students (44 
women; 39 men) from the University of Kansas. The (English) Canadian sample 
consisted of 72 psychology undergraduate students (42 women; 30 men) from the 
University of Western Ontario. Participants from both samples received partial course 
credit in exchange for their involvement. Religious affiliations were generally 
comparable in the two samples:  There were 28 Protestant, 29 Catholic, 9 Jewish, 10 
agnostic, and 7 "other" respondents in the American sample, and there were 28 
Protestant, 17 Catholic, 6 Jewish, 11 agnostic and 9 "other" respondents in the Canadian 
sample. The Canadian respondents were somewhat older (M = 21.72, SD = 6.65) than the 
American respondents (M = 19.06, SD = 2.03), t (153) = 3.47, p < .001, although age was 
not reliably related to any of the variables in the analyses we report. 
Materials and Procedure 
 The study was conducted in small groups. Upon arrival, participants received a 
packet of materials that they completed at their own pace. After the questionnaires were 
completed, participants were debriefed and thanked. 
 Religion measures. As a measure of religious commitment, participants 
completed Gorsuch and Venable’s (1983) “age-universal” adaptation of Allport and 
Ross’s (1967) Intrinsic religious orientation scale (see Burris, 1998, Burris & Jackson, in 
press, and Kirkpatrick & Hood, 1990, for reviews of research supporting use of the 
  
       Religion and National Image  12  
Intrinsic scale as a measure of religious commitment and/or religious group 
identification). This 9-item scale used a 9-point (1 = not at all; 9 = very much) response 
format, and yielded an internal consistency coefficient (Cronbach’s alpha) of .91. For 
comparison purposes, participants also completed three additional measures of religious 
orientation: Gorsuch and Venable's (1983) Extrinsic scale, which measures the degree to 
which religion is deemed useful for seeking nonreligious ends such as personal comfort 
and social status; Batson and Schoenrade's (1991) Quest scale, which measures the 
degree to which asking existential questions, doubts, and openness to change are seen as 
positive aspects of religious experience; and Burris and Tarpley's (1998) Immanence 
scale, which measures degree of emphasis on present-oriented awareness and acceptance 
of one's experience, as well as the motivation to transcend intra- and interpersonal 
boundaries. Because, as expected, the pattern of findings we present was uniquely 
associated with the intrinsic orientation, these other measures will not be discussed 
further. 
 National identification. Participants also completed a 4-item measure of national 
identification. Specifically, they rated how much each of the following items applied to 
them, using a seven-point (1 = not at all; 7 = very much) Likert-type response format: "I 
identify strongly with other Canadians [Americans] as a group"; "I feel attached to my 
identity as a Canadian [American]"; "Even if I could change my nationality, I wouldn't 
want to"; "I value being a member of my nation." These types of items have been used 
successfully to assess degree of identification with a group (or "we-ness") in other 
domains such as gender (Branscombe, Kobrynowicz, & Owen, 1996). This scale yielded 
an internal consistency coefficient (Cronbach’s alpha) of .88. 
 Authoritarianism.  In response to recurring concerns that observed relationships 
between religious indices and variables of interest may be attributable to (right-wing) 
authoritarianism (e.g., Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992), we also asked participants to 
complete Gelfand, Triandis, and Chan's (1995) 8-item measure of authoritarianism. This 
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scale used a 7-point (1 = not at all; 7 = very much) response format, and yielded an 
internal consistency coefficient (Cronbach’s alpha) of .73.  Both this and the previous 
measure were included primarily as covariates, i.e., to assess whether intrinsic religious 
orientation could predict endorsement of national self-stereotypes or symbols over and 
above two variables that seem logically to be more proximally related, viz., authoritarian 
tendencies and intensity of national identification.  
 National stereotypes and symbols. In order to assess the contents of the national 
self-stereotype as well as the salient symbols that participants associated with their 
respective countries, we asked participants to list up to 10 thoughts that came to mind 
when they thought of their nation (Canada or the United States). They were then 
instructed to rate the importance of each thought or idea that they had listed, using a 
seven-point (0 = not at all important; 6 = extremely important) Likert-type response 
format.  
 The first two authors devised a content-coding scheme that incorporated 
categories of stereotypes and symbols that were broad enough to accommodate responses 
from both Americans and Canadians, yet theoretically meaningful enough for us to 
expect differing degrees of endorsement as a function of participants' nationality. For 
example, the "Government" category could accommodate a uniquely American 
respondent such as "two-party system," as well as a uniquely Canadian response such as 
"accessible health care." Two categories of national self-stereotypes were expected to be 
cited as more important by Americans than by Canadians: Heritage and Power.  Three 
categories of national self-stereotypes were expected to be cited as more important by 
Canadians than by Americans: 
Multiculturalism, Government, and Environment.  In addition to these, four other 
categories were identified, none of which was expected to be differentially endorsed as a 
function of nationality: Prosperity, Traits, Emotions, and Other.  Two symbol categories 
also emerged: "Official" symbols, including such things as flags, anthems, and 
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monuments, were expected to be deemed more important by Americans versus 
Canadians; "Unofficial" symbols, including such things as sports, food, and 
entertainment, were not expected to be differentially endorsed as a function of 
nationality. Table 1 presents a sample of the responses that were assigned to each 
category. 
 Two coders, blind to participants’ religious orientation scores, independently 
coded each completed thought-listing task. Interrater agreement was approximately 95%; 
differences were resolved by discussion. Thoughts assigned to any given category 
received a “1” with respect to that category; thoughts not relevant to that particular 
category were assigned a “0.” No thought was assigned a “1” for more than one category. 
Weighted-category scores were subsequently computed by summing the importance 
ratings for every listed thought relevant to a given category for each participant. 
Weighted scores could therefore range from 0 (0 thoughts and/or all importance ratings 
equal to 0) to 60 (10 thoughts and all importance ratings equal to 6). The actual range of 
category scores varied from 0-12 for Power to 0-44 for Official Symbols. 
Results 
Preliminary Analyses 
 Intrinsic religious orientation. Mean Intrinsic religious orientation scores among 
Americans (M = 4.40) and Canadians (M = 3.89) did not differ significantly, t (153) = 
1.49, p < .14. Intrinsic score variances for the Americans (4.37) and Canadians (4.67) 
also did not significantly differ, t < 1, suggesting that it is unlikely that any between-
nation differences in the correlates of intrinsic orientation observed are artifacts of 
differences in Intrinsic scale score distributions between the two samples. 
 National identification. Similarly, the overall level of national identification 
among Americans (M = 5.74) and Canadians (M = 5.76) did not differ, t < 1. National 
identification variances for Americans (1.39) and Canadians (1.77) were also 
comparable, t < 1. 
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 Authoritarianism.  Americans were somewhat more authoritarian (M = 4.44) than 
were Canadians (M = 4.14), however, t = 2.10, p < .04. The variance of American 
authoritarianism scores (.94) was also greater than the variance of Canadian scores (.64), 
t (153) = 2.58, p < .02.  
 National stereotypes and symbols. As shown in Table 2, Canadian and American 
participants spontaneously generated and ascribed importance to thoughts according to 
the predicted pattern.  Specifically, Americans were more likely to list "heritage-related" 
values (e.g., freedom, equal opportunity, tradition, and family) and (military) power as 
relevant and important to American identity than were Canadians with respect to 
Canadian identity. Canadians, in contrast, cited multiculturalism, government, and the 
environment as more important to national identity than did their American counterparts. 
References to prosperity, traits, emotions, and other, unclassifiable themes did not differ 
between the two nations. Also as expected, Americans were more likely than Canadians 
to generate and to ascribe importance to a variety of official national symbols (e.g., flag, 
anthem), whereas references to unofficial symbols (i.e., indirect associations such as 
"hockey" or "apple pie") did not differ between nations. 
Hypothesis Testing 
 To the extent that there exists a fusion of religious and national identities in the 
U.S. or Canada, we expected religious commitment to predict spontaneous association of, 
and importance ascribed to, the self-stereotypes and/or symbols of the respective nations. 
Specifically, we expected intrinsic religious orientation to predict thoughts related to 
heritage, power, and official symbols among Americans. In contrast, we expected 
intrinsic orientation to be associated with thoughts related to multiculturalism, 
government, and the environment, but not official symbols, among Canadians. 
 Results offered partial support for our predictions. First, as shown in Table 3, the 
Intrinsic/Heritage correlation was positive and significant for Americans (p < .006), 
whereas for Canadians it was not; the two correlations significantly differed, z = 1.95, p < 
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.03 (one-tailed). Second, the Intrinsic/Official Symbols correlation was positive and 
significant for Americans (p < .03), but not for Canadians; these two correlations also 
significantly differed, z = 1.85, p < .04 (one-tailed). Third, the Intrinsic/Multiculturalism 
correlation was positive and significant for Canadians (p < .001), whereas for Americans 
it was not; once again, these two correlations significantly differed, z = 3.03, p < .002 
(one-tailed).  Fourth, Intrinsic scale scores were not significantly related to Prosperity, 
Traits, Emotions, Unofficial Symbols, or Other in either national sample. Not consistent 
with predictions, however, the American Intrinsic/Power correlation and the Canadian 
Intrinsic/ Government and Intrinsic/Environment correlations also did not approach 
significance.   As shown in Table 3, the correlations between either national 
identification or authoritarianism and national self-stereotypes and symbols were 
generally unremarkable, with a few exceptions. Both national identification and 
authoritarianism predicted greater emotional responses and endorsement of heritage-
related thoughts among Americans, whereas national identification predicted decreased 
endorsement of traits among Americans.  For Canadians, as for Americans, national 
identification predicted greater emotional responses. In no case did simultaneously 
controlling for national identification and authoritarianism reduce to nonsignificance any 
of the significant correlations between intrinsic religious orientation and national self-
stereotypes or symbols in Table 3, however. 
Discussion 
 The differences in national self-stereotypes of Americans and Canadians observed 
were generally consistent with those postulated by Lipset (1990a, 1990b, 1996) based on 
the different historical origins of the respective nations. Specifically, Americans 
spontaneously cited "heritage"-related values (e.g., freedom, equal opportunity, tradition, 
and family) and (military) power as relevant and important to American identity, whereas 
Canadians associated Canada with multiculturalism and other government policies.  
Americans were also more likely than Canadians to ascribe importance to official 
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national symbols such as the flag, as predicted, whereas no differences emerged with 
respect to unofficial symbols.  Canadians were more likely than Americans to include the 
natural environment as part of their national self-stereotype, a finding which -- although 
not directly derivable from Lipset's analysis -- is not surprising due to Canada's larger 
size and sparser population (e.g., Keohane, 1997; Olive, 1996).  No differences emerged 
with respect to thoughts regarding prosperity, another unsurprising finding given the 
generally comparable levels of economic and technological attainment in the U.S. and 
Canada.  Similarly, no national differences emerged with respect to the importance of 
traits ascribed (the aspect of national stereotypes that perhaps most resembles the content 
of stereotypes of individuals) or emotions evoked by the two nations. 
 Having noted the striking similarity between nation and religion in terms of the 
provisions that they offer their respective adherents -- viz., collective identity, common 
group stereotypes, and shared symbols -- we reasoned that devout religious commitment 
might predict endorsement of national self-stereotypes in both the U.S. and Canada. We 
found partial support for this prediction.  Intrinsic religious orientation indeed predicted 
ascribing importance to multiculturalism among Canadians, but it did not predict 
thoughts related to other government policies or the physical environment. Similarly, 
intrinsic orientation predicted ascribing importance to "the national heritage" among 
Americans, but it did not predict thoughts related to power. Thus, in each country, 
religious commitment was associated only with those aspects of the national self-
stereotype that are explicitly ideological, versus those that are more internationally 
consensual. To illustrate this distinction, consider how each nation may perceive the 
other. Few Canadians would dispute the U.S.'s ability to influence world affairs, for 
example, but many might question the freedoms and equal opportunity that the U.S. 
claims to offer in light of its continued problems with racism. Similarly, many Americans 
may note Canada's vast expanse of wilderness or its reputation for lower crime and a 
more accessible health care system, but few would be convinced of Canada's 
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commitment to multiculturalism in light of the ongoing threat of Quebec's separation 
(e.g., Olive, 1996). By focusing on the subjective, ideological aspects of their respective 
national stereotypes, intrinsically religious individuals in the U.S. and Canada seem to be 
projecting a commitment to their own nation's preferred vision of itself, i.e., to notions of 
what the nation "should" be.  Moreover, partial correlation analyses suggested that this 
apparent commitment was not attributable to greater levels of national identification or 
authoritarianism among intrinsically religious persons.     
 Thus, religion appears to be associated with acceptance rather than rejection of 
the prevailing national ideology, at least among North American university students. That 
is, in both the U.S. and Canada, the line between religious and national striving seems 
blurred: God may in fact "serve the national order," as Billig (1995) suggested. It is 
worth reiterating, however, that the contents of prevailing ideologies differ across 
nations:  The notion of individual striving for success that is enshrined as part of the 
American heritage contrasts rather sharply with the more interdependent, group-focused 
conception of Canadian multiculturalism, for example. Thus, although both the U.S. and 
Canada show evidence of "civil religion," the potential sociopolitical implications of 
devout religious commitment may differ depending on the national context in which it 
occurs.  
 The mode of expression that civil religion takes may also differ as a function of 
national context. In the U.S., civil religion appears to be externalized via traditional 
national symbols, as religiously committed Americans were more likely than the less 
committed to ascribe importance to such objects as the Stars and Stripes. Among 
Canadians, in contrast, civil religion does not appear to be consistently externalized, as 
religious commitment did not predict the degree to which official Canadian national 
symbols, such as the Maple Leaf, were emphasized. Thus, to borrow the traditional 
ecclesiastical distinction between "high church" (those that emphasize sacrament and 
ritual) and "low church" (those that deeemphasize the same), intrinsically religious 
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Americans appear to be "high church" with respect to their national devotion.  In 
contrast, "low church" national devotion appears to be preferable among Canadians. This 
is a curious finding, given that precisely the opposite would be expected in the religious 
domain due to the historical prominence of high church denominations (e.g., Anglican) in 
Canada and low church denominations (e.g., Baptist) in the U.S. (e.g., Lipset, 1990a).1 
This raises the interesting possibility that some form of symbolic expression is essential 
to obtain the maximum benefits of identification with social groups, such that the relative 
absence of symbols in one domain may be associated with increased symbol use in other 
domains (cf. Wicklund & Gollwitzer, 1982). More broadly, consideration of the overlap 
between religious and national identities raises questions concerning "meta-identity," and 
whether functional similarities or complementarities between religion, nation, and other 
social identifications (e.g., gender, ethnicity) can account for their apparent overlap in the 
self-structure. Such a structural-functional analysis may ultimately provide a coherent 
account of how individuals successfully or unsuccessfully manage their multiple social 
category memberships (cf. Deaux, 1996). 
 We should at this point offer an important qualifier with respect to interpretation 
of our Canadian data. Specifically, the Canadian sample consisted exclusively of 
Anglophones rather than Francophones. Ongoing national discussions regarding 
Quebec's possible secession from Canada, combined with that province's lower ranking 
on traditional measures of religiosity compared to any other region of North America 
("How Very Different We Are," 1996), suggests that there is little reason to believe that 
our Canadian results regarding national and religious identification would generalize to a 
French-Canadian sample. Indeed, a natural extension of the present research would be to 
examine similarities and differences in the spontaneous national stereotypes of French 
and English Canadians.  Such an effort would not only be consistent with the spirit of 
Canada's official commitment to multiculturalism, but it may also help to clarify what 
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common ground exists between these two peoples.  Inuit Canadians' national self-
stereotypes could be similarly explored. 
 The thought-listing technique that we used to explore national self-stereotypes in 
this study is not, by itself, novel: Variants have been employed successfully to measure 
distinct components of intergroup attitudes (Esses, Haddock, and Zanna, 1993) and 
cognitive responses to persuasive messages (Petty, Ostrom, & Brock, 1981), for example. 
We believe that its use in the context of assessing national self-stereotypes is an 
important innovation, however, for it by-passes some of the potential problems associated 
with standard survey techniques. Most notably, the free response format seems 
particularly well suited to assessing respondents' spontaneous associations in reference to 
their respective nations. Unlike survey questions, the contents of which may prime 
respondents to think about their respective nations in ways that they might not have 
otherwise, the thought-listing technique allows for assessment of the most accessible 
images. Relatedly, exclusive reliance upon standard survey techniques could leave 
important aspects of national stereotypes unassessed, unless one has the foresight to 
include all of the relevant items.  
 These advantages notwithstanding, we should also note that our thought-listing 
technique is still a self-report measure. Thus, it is an open question as to whether the 
importance that intrinsically religious persons ascribed to aspects of their national 
ideologies is more than lip-service. It is unknown whether there is any corresponding 
impact upon political attitudes or voting behavior, and whether that translates into a more 
left-leaning religious vote in Canada and a more right-leaning religious vote in the U.S. 
(e.g., Benson & Williams, 1982). Indeed, the veracity of self-reported relationships 
between religious commitment and prosocial behavior (e.g., helping) has been seriously 
questioned due to intrinsically religious persons' apparent motivation to present 
themselves in a socially desirable fashion (see Batson et al., 1993; see also Burris & 
Jackson, in press). Thus, in the present study, intrinsically religious Canadians professed 
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to enshrine multiculturalism, but whether they would indeed vote in favor of pro-
immigration legislation is an open question. Likewise, although intrinsically religious 
Americans professed to enshrine individual freedom as part of their shared heritage, 
whether they would be prepared to defend civil liberties is unknown. Political issues are 
often sufficiently complex as to invoke conflicting ideological commitments, however. 
Burning the U.S. flag, for example, pits the American value of freedom of expression 
against respect for traditional national symbols. Certainly, the context of such an event 
may determine which ideological commitment is more salient and influential. Thus, the 
behavioral implications of endorsement of multiple aspects of national ideology, as 
moderated by situation-specific conflicts and religious and/or national identification, may 
prove to be a fascinating line of research.  
 For now, our results remind us of the messages about nations than can be 
encountered in the U.S. and Canada. We have heard anecdotes of Canadians who 
attended American services and heard the minister proclaim that "God made America 
great." We have also heard of Americans who attended Canadian services of the same 
denomination and heard the minister denounce the importing of American culture by 
saying that "pretty soon we [Canadians] will be thinking like them." The different -- yet 
similar -- implications of the links between religion and politics across national borders 
can be startling. Thus, although there is little question that the devoutly religious perceive 
themselves to be preservers of "the good," what constitutes "the good" may be more 
locally defined than congregations and their members realize.  
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Footnote 
 1Post-hoc probing revealed two noteworthy religious affiliation effects. First, 
mirroring the dominance of (particularly evangelical) Protestantism in U.S. history, 
American Protestants ascribed significantly (p < .05) greater importance to heritage-
related thoughts (M = 10.36) than any other religious group (particularly Canadian 
Protestants, who were in fact the lowest scoring group, M = 3.39). Second, consistent 
with Lipset's (1990a) suggestion than Canadian Catholics have historically been more 
politically left-leaning than their American Catholic peers, these two groups were the 
highest and lowest scoring groups with respect to Multiculturalism (Ms = 6.76 and 1.31, 
respectively, p < .05), although neither group significantly differed from their same-
nation Protestant or non-Christian religious peers.  
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Table 1 
Sample Contents of National Self-Stereotypes and Symbol Categories 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
- 
Distinctive American Stereotypes 
 Heritage  freedom, democracy, liberty, land of opportunity,   
    patriotism, family values, tradition/history 
 Power    superpower, armed forces, strength 
 
Distinctive Canadian Stereotypes 
 Multiculturalism welcomes all people, tolerant of diversity, immigration,  
    helps other nations, melting pot, racism 
 Government  welfare, health care system, safety, laws, politics,   
    corruption, national debt 
 Environment  big, beautiful, clean, wilderness, pollution 
 
Non-distinctive National Stereotypes 
 Prosperity  technology, jobs, education, wealthy, poverty,   
    homelessness 
 Traits   compassion, quiet, reasonable, reliable, obnoxious,   
    arrogant, lazy, self-destructive 
 Emotions  happiness, optimism, pride, togetherness, confidence 
 Other   bright colors, easily identified 
 
National Symbols 
 Official   anthems, monuments, president/prime minister, 
flags,      eagle/beaver 
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 Unofficial  baseball/hockey, apple pie/beer, rock 'n' roll, "eh?" 
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Table 2 
Comparison of National Self-Stereotype and Symbol Scores by Nation 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-       Nation 
    -----------------------------------------------------------------------
-Category    U.S.    Canada 
 t 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-Distinctive American Stereotypes 
 Heritage   7.66    4.36           3.47*** 
 Power    1.77     .19           4.10*** 
Distinctive Canadian Stereotypes 
 Multiculturalism  2.06    5.01           4.30*** 
 Government   3.45    5.18           2.09* 
 Environment     .87    4.47           5.47*** 
Non-distinctive National Stereotypes 
 Prosperity   3.53    2.96  <1 
 Traits    1.49    2.51  1.62 
 Emotions   2.40    2.79  <1 
 Other      .88      .46  1.31 
National Symbols 
 Official    2.54     .72 
 2.13* 
 Unofficial   1.14    1.35  <1 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-Note. All significance tests are two-tailed. 
*p < .05; ***p < .001.   
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Table 3 
Correlations between Predictors and Importance-Weighted National Stereotypes and 
Symbols by Nation 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
- 
     U.S.    Canada   
   --------------------------------------------------------------------------------




 Intrinsic      .20       .24*           -.01        .14 
 National ID          .54***            -.04 
Distinctive American Stereotypes 
 Heritage  .30**   .32**       .24*    -.01        .16         -.05     
 Power   .10   .05       .01      .04        .02          .04 
Distinctive Canadian Stereotypes  
 Multiculturalism         -.11  -.12      -.03      .37***   -.10         .03 
 Government            -.03      .02       .04      .02         .17         .21 
 Environment  .10  -.04      -.02     -.10         .22         .03 
Non-distinctive National Stereotypes  
 Prosperity            -.04  -.08      -.12      .10        -.03         .05 
 Traits             -.02  -.24*      -.20     -.11         .01         .05  
 Emotions  .07   .27*       .29**    -.01         .24*       .18  
 Other             -.18  -.09      -.02      .05         .11         .03 
National Symbols 
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 Official   .24*    .03       .10    -.07         .10        -
.04  
 Unofficial            -.11   -.21      -.04    -.13         .15         .13    
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-Note. All significance tests are two-tailed. 
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.  
 
 
 
 
